Evil is Necessary for Freedom of Will to Exist
The Free Will Response to the Problem of Natural Evil
This is a response to the problem of natural evil. According to Swinburne in 'The Problem of Evil,' for people to have free will in any worthwhile sense or, in other words, for people to possess a real and important choice between committing good or evil acts there are two requirements:
1. People must 'have true beliefs about the effects of [their] actions.' [Swinburne in Stump & Murray 1999, 211]
2. There must be excessive evils in the world for people to gain experience of.
Explaining the Free Will Response
The regularity of nature's laws is necessary for fulfilling the first requirement. Without this regularity human beings would not have enough confidence in their beliefs concerning the consequences of their actions to 'make it matter how [they] choose.' [Swinburne in Stump & Murray 1999, 211]
The second requirement is a necessary condition for humans to truly possess free will because without it people could not come to know of excessive suffering and, as a result, would not have been given the opportunity to carry out excessively evil acts. Swinburne argues that suffering brought about through natural disasters is the best way to fulfil this second requirement.
An alternative method of providing suffering in the world might have been to make humans more naturally depraved; but this would, Swinburne argues, have made existence worse; all facts considered. [Swinburne in Stump & Murray 1999, 216] As a result natural evils occurring coherently with scientific laws is the price that people must pay for our own free will. That said, it is the smallest price to pay and a worthy price to pay considering the reward.
Discussing the Free Will Response
One problem the argument might face is that the levels of natural evil in the world seem excessive for achieving this goal. Swinburne's response to this is that there is a correlation between the evils which people experience and the evils which they are capable of carrying out. It follows that for humans to be free to carry out excessive evils there must first be naturally occurring excessive evils in the world for everyone to experience and imitate. Humanity's imagination would never have been capable of creating inventions such as the atomic bomb without first witnessing excessive suffering in nature, such as volcanoes.
Swinburne's response extends into another area. To grant complete freedom of will, the natural disasters must be excessive to create a world where our choices really matter. [Swinburne cited by Davies 1998, 171] It gives increased responsibility for everyone to behave well. Swinburne put it succinctly when he said that by providing less excessive natural evil in the world God would have created a "toy-world, a world where things matter, but not very much; where [people] can choose and our choices make a small difference, but the real choice remains God's." [Swinburne cited by Davies 1998, 171] It is only by showing humans the worst suffering to which they could stoop that God can make this world truly our world where people are completely free to act how they wish to.
Problem with Swinburne's Free Will Response
One problem Swinburne's response faces is that free will, good and evil, and the capacity to look at natural disasters and develop the choice between committing good and evil acts are all very human concerns. Before humanity, for example when the comet that wiped out the dinosaurs struck earth, there would have been no greater good that was achieved through such natural evil. At that prehistoric time it can be argued that good and evil did not exist because one animal killing another is not an evil act; it is instinctual behaviour.
Another, more serious problem though, is why an omnipotent being would make evil a necessary means to achieving free will in the first place. Click here to find out more.
Free Will and the Problem of Evil
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